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INSURANCE AND CATASTROPHE IN THE CASE
OF KATRINA AND BEYOND
Douglas R. Richmond*
I. INTRODUCTION
In insurance parlance, a "catastrophe" is an unusually severe disaster
affecting many insurers and policyholders. Disasters may be either natural
or man-made. Natural disasters include earthquakes, floods, hurricanes,
tornados, tropical storms, tsunamis, wildfires, and winter storms, some of
these obviously being more common than others.' Perhaps the best exam-
ple of a man-made disaster is a terrorist attack.2 Hurricane Katrina clearly
qualifies as a catastrophe; indeed, it has been characterized as "the largest
natural catastrophe ever to strike the United States"3 and "the costliest
natural disaster in U.S. History."4
Although the exact total of property insurance losses attributable to
Katrina remains unknown, the amount is at least $38.1 billion5 and perhaps
as much as $55 billion.6 Either figure reflects "an amount large enough to
wipe out most of the estimated pretax operating profit of the entire insur-
ance industry for the year."7 As insurance goes, Hurricane Katrina dwarfs
natural disasters such as Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge Earth-
quake, which cost the industry $21.6 billion and $16.5 billion, respectively.8
Katrina likewise surpasses the worst man-made catastrophe-the terrorist
attack on the World Trade Center of September 11, 2001-which produced
$20.7 billion in property insurance losses.9
The wretched federal response to Katrina, the lingering hardships suf-
fered by many storm victims, and the storm's long-term alteration of myr-
iad aspects of business and life in the states which it struck heighten the
level of concern otherwise accompanying forecasts of more numerous
* Senior Vice President, Professional Services Group, Aon Risk Services, Chicago, Illinois.
J.D., University of Kansas; M. Ed., University of Nebraska; B.S., Fort Hays State University. Opinions
expressed herein are the author's alone.
1. Ins. Info. Inst., Catastrophes: Insurance Issues 2 (Jan. 2006), http://www.iii.org/media/hottop-
ics. Over the period 1985-2004, hurricanes and tropical storms accounted for 34.6% of all catastrophe
losses; tornados made up 30.4%; winter storms accounted for 9.7%; earthquakes made up 8.4%; floods
accounted for 3.4%; and fires made up 2.9%. Id.
2. Id. Terrorism accounted for 9.7% of total catastrophe losses during the period 1985-2004.
Id.
3. Meg Green, Not Business As Usual, BEST'S REV., June 2006, at 27, 27.
4. Rawle 0. King, Hurricane Katrina: Insurance Losses and National Capacities for Financing
Disaster Risk, at CRS-4 (Congressional Res. Serv., Sept. 2005) (on file with author).
5. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 1, at 1.
6. Jean-Pierre Berliet, Katrina: Why Risk Management Failed, BEST's REV., June 2006, at 34, 34.
7. Id.
8. Robert P. Hartwig, Hurricane Season of 2005: Impacts on US P/C Insurance Markets in 2006
& Beyond (Ins. Info Inst., Mar. 2006) (on file with author).
9. Id.
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hurricanes in the future.'" Predictions of a $76 billion hurricane in Florida,
a $21 billion hurricane in the Northeast, a $72 billion California earth-
quake, and a $101 billion earthquake along the New Madrid fault similarly
add to the alarm. 1 Some prognosticators confidently predict a northeast-
ern hurricane twice as costly as Katrina that could devastate the New York
boroughs of Brooklyn and Manhattan and submerge nearby parts of New
Jersey. 12 The type of storm surge that ravaged the Louisiana and Missis-
sippi coasts could be replicated in Boston, Galveston, Houston, or Miami
were hurricanes to strike those communities.' 3 California's Central Valley,
where at least forty percent of the nation's fruit and vegetable crops are
grown, is protected by levees known to be woefully inadequate. The disas-
trous breaches of New Orleans's levees illustrate the danger flooding poses
to California's agricultural economy. 4
Catastrophe victims may in the first instance look to governments for
help, but almost immediately thereafter they think of insurance. In some
cases they may even think of insurance first and derive some comfort from
the belief that they are protected whatever their loss may be. The insur-
ance industry has historically responded well to catastrophes. Insurance
companies dispatch legions of experienced, qualified adjusters to affected
areas and efficiently and fairly resolve most claims. Using Hurricane Ka-
trina as an example, within six months of the storm "insurers had paid most
of the record volume of personal lines claims, and many took extraordinary
steps to do so."' 5 It now appears that homeowners' insurers have resolved
roughly ninety-five percent of the claims attributable to Hurricane Ka-
trina. 6 That does not mean, of course, that all insureds are satisfied with
the way in which their carriers resolved their claims. 7 Yet, empirical data
suggest that most homeowners are pleased with the treatment which they
received from their insurers. According to one poll, eighty-nine percent of
homeowners in Louisiana and ninety-three percent in Mississippi are con-
tent with their insurance companies. 8 That same poll also refutes critics'
instinctive contention that satisfied insureds are only found inland (where
most damage was wind-related and thus covered by standard homeowners'
and property insurance policies), while policyholders in coastal areas feel
10. John Gibeaut, Up Against the Seawall, A.B.A. J., July 2006, at 45, 46.
11. J. David Cummins et al., Can Insurers Pay for the "Big One?" Measuring the Capacity of an
Insurance Market to Respond to Catastrophic Losses 1 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 98-
11-B, 1999) (on file with author).
12. Amanda Ripley, Why We Don't Prepare, TIME, Aug. 28, 2006, at 54, 57.
13. Munich Re Group, Hurricanes-More Intense, More Frequent, More Expensive 21 (Munich
Re Group Knowledge Series, 2006) (on file with author).
14. Id. at 22.
15. Green, supra note 3, at 27.
16. Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst., Nearly 95 Percent of Homeowners Claims from Hurricane
Katrina Settled and Tens of Billions of Dollars Paid to Affected Communities in Louisiana and Missis-
sippi (Aug. 22, 2006), available at http://www.iii.org/media/updates/press.760032/.
17. See Becky Yerak, Insurers Say 95% of Katrina Claims Met, CHI. TRmB., Aug. 23, 2006, § 3, at 1
("Just because claims are settled doesn't mean consumers have been treated justly, [insurance industry
critics say].").
18. Press Release, Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 16, at 1.
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mistreated by their insurers. "While satisfaction numbers are slightly
higher inland, most residents in the hardest hit coastal areas describe them-
selves satisfied with the way their claim was handled."19
In any event, catastrophes and insurance are inextricably linked, and
this Article will explain and examine several aspects of that linkage. Part II
of this Article briefly discusses basic insurance economics, while part III
examines some critical insurance law issues that Hurricane Katrina has
spawned.
II. SOME INSURANCE FUNDAMENTALS
Insurance companies have two means of prospering financially: under-
writing profit and investment income. Underwriting profit is simply an in-
surer's premiums collected, less claim payments and other expenses.
Underwriting profit or loss is typically expressed in terms of a combined
ratio. For example, a combined ratio of 90.0 would mean that for every
dollar an insurer earned in premium income, it paid out $0.90 in claims and
expenses (thereby making an underwriting profit). On the other hand, a
ratio of 110.0 would mean that for every dollar earned in premium income,
an insurer paid out $1.10 in claims and expenses (thus producing an under-
writing loss). Underwriting losses are quite common. Between 1979 and
2005, property and casualty insurers as a whole turned an underwriting
profit only once-in 2004.20 How then has the industry not collapsed? The
answer is investment income.
Insurers invest the bulk of the premiums they collect. This is possible
because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval some-
times extending over many years. Given the history of underwriting losses
dating back to the late 1970s, recent industry-wide financial success is
plainly attributable to insurers' investment income. Insurance companies
that have turned underwriting profits-or at least have substantially mini-
mized their underwriting losses-have fared better financially than those
that have not. These companies are said to have "underwriting discipline,"
a term of somewhat varied meaning, but principally describing a willing-
ness to accept only those risks the companies are able to properly evaluate
and profitably price. 1 Companies possessing underwriting discipline also
structure their business in a way that no aggregation of losses from a single
catastrophe or series of catastrophes will threaten their solvency.
Before Hurricane Katrina struck, the property and casualty insurance
industry was on track to record its highest level of profitability since 1987.22
19. Id.
20. Robert P. Hartwig, Commentary on Full-Year 2005 Results 1 (Ins. Info. Inst., Apr. 18, 2006)
(on file with author).
21. Degrees of underwriting discipline vary, and even some generally disciplined companies will
insure risks they might otherwise decline during periods of high investment returns as the price of
obtaining money to invest.
22. Even so, insurers are less profitable than Fortune 500 companies as a whole. "Contrary to
some media reports, the property/casualty insurance industry did not even come close to experiencing
record profitability in 2005." Hartwig, supra note 20, at 1-2.
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Despite Katrina-and her evil little sisters Rita and Wilma-the industry
reported a 2005 operating profit of $41.5 billion.23 Insurance companies
weathered 2005 with an amazingly low combined ratio of 100.9.24 Hurri-
cane Katrina and the other storms of 2005 doubtless cut into insurers' earn-
ings, but they did not impair capital.
The industry's resilience in the face of an exceedingly difficult 2005 is
attributable in no small part to improved underwriting discipline across the
board. In the first half of 2005, the industry-wide combined ratio was 92.7,
down from 115.7 in 2001.25 Over the past few years, insurers have better
matched risks and prices, while also tightening coverage terms. They have
also taken steps to reduce their exposures along the hurricane-prone Gulf
and Atlantic Coasts, a market retreat further influenced by regulators' un-
willingness to approve rate increases reflecting greater risks and reinsur-
ance costs going forward.26
Insureds in catastrophe-prone areas are likely to feel the effects of in-
surers' underwriting discipline well into the future. Where they have been
able to achieve property insurance rate increases, insurers have sharply
raised rates in coastal areas.27 These increases began in late 2005. At the
same time, insurers have reduced capacity (i.e., the amount of risk they are
willing to assume measured in dollars) through lower coverage limits and
imposition of sub-limits.28 Insurers have also insisted on higher deductibles
and multiple deductibles. Some insurers have withdrawn from areas likely
to be affected by hurricanes in the future.
Insurers were also able to withstand losses attributable to the storms
of 2005 because of increased returns on their investments. Rising interest
rates and small stock market gains allowed insurance companies to gener-
ate investment revenue of $59.2 billion in 2005.29
Finally, insurers were able to weather the storms of 2005 by spreading
their risk through reinsurance. "Reinsurance is essentially insurance for
insurance companies."30 When procuring reinsurance, an insurance com-
pany-the "cedent" or "ceding company"-pays a premium to a reinsurer
in exchange for the reinsurer's promise to indemnify it for some or all of
the insurer's exposure on policies it has issued.31 Among insurers with
2005 hurricane-related exposure, some companies may have ceded as much
23. Aon Risk Servs., March 2006 Insurance Market Overview 6 (Aon Corp. 2006) (on file with
author).
24. Hartwig, supra note 20, at 1. "This means that for every dollar of premium income that came
in the door in 2005, about $1.01 exited in the form of claim payments, claims reserves and expenses
.... .Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 1, at 8-9. Hurricane Rita caused insured losses of roughly $5 billion,
while Hurricane Wilma caused approximately $10.3 billion in insured losses. Id.
25. Hartwig, supra note 20, at 3.
26. Id.
27. Aon Risk Servs., supra note 23, at 10.
28. Id. at 11.
29. Hartwig, supra note 20, at 1.
30. Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 358 F.3d 757, 761 (10th Cir. 2004);
accord Covington v. Am. Chambers Life Ins. Co., 779 N.E.2d 833, 836 n.1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) ("Rein-
surance is insurance for insurance companies.").
31. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co., 427 F.3d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 2005).
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as sixty percent of their risk to reinsurers, and industry experts estimate
that reinsurance may reduce insurance companies' 2005 gross catastrophe
losses from approximately $58 billion to $19 billion or less. 32 Unfortu-
nately, reinsurers have suffered considerably because of the 2005 storms,
which occurred on top of significant losses attributable to the 2004 storms.
These events, coupled with predictions of increased hurricane activity in
coming years, seem certain to ripple through the insurance industry.
Whatever the reasons that property and casualty insurers have prof-
ited in the face of Hurricane Katrina and other catastrophes, the fact that
they have done so doubtless angers storm victims who have had their
claims denied in whole or part, had their coverage cancelled, or have seen
their insurance rates rise dramatically.33 Such insureds care nothing about
insurers' underwriting discipline, instead quite understandably focusing on
their plights and those of their neighbors. More than a few policyholder
advocates have invoked the image of Cuthbert Heath, a storied Lloyd's of
London underwriter. Following the great San Francisco Earthquake of
1906, Heath cabled his company's United States lawyers to say: "Pay all
our policyholders in full irrespective of the terms of their policies.
3 4
But we live in different times and Mr. Heath would likely not send the
same message today. Insurance is not welfare, and insurance companies
are businesses-not aid societies. Shareholders expect insurers to profit
regardless of catastrophes. In the insurance industry as elsewhere, inves-
tors' expectations drive business decisions. Additionally, only a few years
ago wind claims attributable to Hurricane Andrew caused ten insurers to
fail and imperiled the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association. The "big
one" or a "mega-catastrophe" (an earthquake or hurricane far costlier than
Katrina, which many forecasters predict will occur) would cause a number
of insurance company insolvencies and seriously disrupt the insurance mar-
ket, perhaps even crippling it.3 6 In sum, insurers' catastrophe-related fi-
nancial decisions, though unpopular in storm-ravaged areas and dispiriting
to those they negatively affect, are understandable when viewed through a
wider lens.
III. INSURANCE LAW ISSUES RELATED TO KATRINA
Insurance-related legal issues surfaced immediately in Katrina's wake.
Much of the damage the storm caused-unlike the damage from Hurricane
32. Hartwig, supra note 20, at 3-4.
33. See, e.g., Hurricanes Haven't Cut into Insurance Companies' Profits, HATIESBURG AM., Apr.
27, 2006, available at http://www.hattiesburgamerican.com (editorializing that "insurance companies
have the ability to continue providing homeowners' insurance-at reasonable rates-throughout the
hurricane zone").
34. Outlook: Insurer's Honour, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 24, 2001, at 17.
35. Ins. Info. Inst., Insolvencies/Guaranty Funds, (Nov. 2006), http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/
insurance/insolvencies/.
36. King, supra note 4, at CRS-5.
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Andrew, for example-was attributable to flooding rather than wind.
37
Katrina's storm surge was overwhelming. Accordingly, controversy
quickly centered on water damage exclusions in standard homeowners'
policies. Standard homeowners' insurance policies "do not insure for loss
caused directly or indirectly" by water damage to dwellings or other struc-
tures on insureds' residence premises, "regardless of any cause or event
contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss."38 As used in
these policies, "water damage" means "[f]lood, surface water, waves, tidal
water, overflow of a body of water, or spray from any of these, whether or
not driven by wind."39 Water that is part of storm surge clearly qualifies as
a flood, and storm surge may additionally be characterized as surface
water, waves, or tidal water.4" Standard policies' omission of "storm surge"
when defining "water damage" is inconsequential, given their mention of
flood, surface water, waves, and tidal water, and especially since "storm
surge" is no more specific or descriptive than any of these terms.
Homeowners' policies also include a "combined causes" exclusion that
bars coverage for "weather conditions" if they "contribute in any way" to
causing a loss in concert with an excluded cause or event (such as water
damage).41 As for personal property, homeowners' policies include as cov-
ered perils windstorm or hail, but these perils do not include "loss to...
property contained in a building caused by rain ... unless the direct force
of wind or hail damages the building causing an opening in a roof or wall
and the rain ... enters through this opening."42
Commercial property insurance policies include similar flood and com-
bined causes exclusions.43 Where commercial insurers agree to insure
against flood damage, they typically impose sub-limits.44 At least one large
commercial insured has sued its property insurer for coverage for losses
caused by storm surge and wind-driven rain from Hurricane Katrina.45
Two universities in New Orleans have sued their insurers for their alleged
unwillingness to pay valid flood and business interruption losses.4 6
37. James A. Knox, Jr., Causation, the Flood Exclusion, and Katrina, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 901, 903 (2006).
38. AUTO CLUB FAMILY INS. CO., PREMIER PLUS HOMEOWNERS POLICY 20 (on file with author).
39. Id. at 21.
40. See Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 688-89 (S.D. Miss. 2006). The
court explained that "storm surge is a type of flooding that is covered by flood policies sold under the
National Flood Insurance Program and excluded under standard homeowners policies." Id. at 692.
41. AUTO CLUB FAMILY INS. Co., supra note 38, at 21-22.
42. Id. at 17-18
43. See, e.g., HANOVER INS., HANOBUSINESS BUSINESSOWNERS INSURANCE POLICY 6-7 (on file
with author).
44. Vincent J. Vitkowsky, Reinsurance Issues Arising from the 2005 Hurricane Season, 41 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 999, 1000 (2006).
45. Leslie A. Platt, First Party Coverage for Catastrophic Risks, INSURANCE COVERAGE 2006:
CLAIM TRENDS & LITIGATION 198 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. H-742,
2006).
46. Katherine Mangan & Jeffrey Selingo, 2 Universities Sue Insurers over Katrina Damage,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 1, 2006, at A53.
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A. Flood Versus Wind
Flood insurance is available through the National Flood Insurance
Program ("NFIP"), which is administered through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency ("FEMA") under the National Flood Insurance Act
of 1968 ("NFIA").4 7 In an effort to reduce future flood damage, the NFIP
makes flood insurance available for commercial and residential properties
in communities that voluntarily adopt and enforce floodplain management
ordinances.4 8 About 20,000 communities currently participate in the pro-
gram. Property owners in NFIP communities may purchase flood insur-
ance even if their properties are outside a floodplain. Coverage comes in
the form of a Standard Flood Insurance Policy ("SFIP"), with coverage
limits of $250,000 for structural damage and $100,000 for contents.49
FEMA dictates SFIP terms. °
For years, flood insurance was available only through insurance agents
who dealt directly with the Federal Insurance Administration ("FIA").
The FIA was placed under FEMA's control in 1983, and since then the
"direct" flood insurance program has been augmented by what has come to
be known as the Write-Your-Own program ("WYO"). Almost all flood
insurance policies today are issued through the WYO program. 51 Distilled
to its essence, the WYO program works in the following way. Participating
property and casualty insurers enter into contracts with the FIA. These
companies are known as "WYO insurers," and they are fiscal agents of the
United States.52 They issue flood insurance policies in their own names.
These insurers charge nearly the same premium as the federal government
charges for policies issued through the direct program. 53 The carriers ad-
just, defend, settle, and pay all flood claims arising under the policies they
issue. The companies receive small administrative fees for policies written
and claims processed, but they remit the remainder of the premiums they
collect to the government.54 The government reimburses WYO insurers
for claims they pay and bears all underwriting losses.5
The NFIP is self-supporting; losses as well as operating and adminis-
trative expenses are paid out of collected policy premiums.56 Additionally,
the NFIP is authorized to borrow up to $1.5 billion from the United States
Treasury, though it must repay any loans with interest. WYO insurers
never lose money through the NFIP.57 If it appears that the program is
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2006).
48. Robert P. Hartwig & Claire Wilkinson, The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 2
(Ins. Info. Inst., Oct. 2005) (on file with author).
49. Businesslnsurance.com, Flooding from Hurricanes Pushes Wave of Claim Reform 2 (Apr. 17,
2006), http://www.businessinsurance.com.
50. Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 2005).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Hartwig & Wilkinson, supra note 48, at 4.
54. Businesslnsurance.com, supra note 49, at 2.
55. See Hartwig & Wilkinson, supra note 48, at 4.
56. Id.
57. Businesslnsurance.com, supra note 49, at 3.
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going into the red, FEMA instructs the insurers to temporarily halt claims
payments.58 Claims payments are suspended until FEMA receives con-
gressional authorization to borrow additional funds. FEMA has done that
only once-in November 2005.19
Nationally, only about twenty percent of homeowners living in flood-
prone areas purchase flood insurance.6 ° Many eligible homeowners living
in areas vulnerable to hurricanes do not purchase flood insurance. The
reasons for this are poorly understood. Agents and brokers typically re-
ceive the same commissions for selling flood insurance that they do for
selling other types of policies, so they have no economic reason to discour-
age customers from purchasing flood coverage. Certainly many Mississip-
pians did not have flood insurance when Hurricane Katrina hit.61 As of
September 2005, less than one in five businesses or homes in Mississippi
were insured against flood lOSS. 62 In some of the hardest hit areas of the
state, fewer than one in ten homeowners had flood insurance.
63 Mississippi
homeowners generally did not purchase flood insurance because their
mortgage companies did not require it or because their properties were not
located in designated flood plains.64 The picture in other affected states is
murky. In the most severely affected area of Louisiana, for example, some
reports indicate that only two in five households were insured against dam-
ages due to flooding.65 Other reports indicate that of the thousands of sin-
gle-family homes in Louisiana that sustained hurricane-related flood
damage, almost sixty-five percent were covered by flood insurance.66
Storm victims without flood insurance who became homeless or had
their lives otherwise devastated still may have thought they were protected
under their homeowners' policies. Unfortunately, many policyholders who
neglected to purchase flood insurance found their claims denied in whole
or part on the basis that their losses were caused by water damage. Some
carriers routinely insisted that storm surge rather than wind destroyed
dwellings. 67 Other insurers struggled with whether structures were dam-
aged by wind before the storm surge arrived and, if so, what percentage of
any given loss should be paid as being caused by wind or denied as being
58. Id.
59. Kathy Chu, FEMA Halts Flood Insurance Payments, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 2005, at lB.
60. Ripley, supra note 12, at 58.
61. Rick Cornejo, Searching for a Cause, BEST'S REV., Feb. 2006, at 22, 23.
62. Aon Re Inc. & Leboeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae LLP, Report on Legal Precedents Rele-
vant to Hurricane Katrina Losses 1 (Sept. 2005) (on file with author).
63. Knox, supra note 37, at 911.
64. Cornejo, supra note 61, at 23.
65. Knox, supra note 37, at 911. See also Green, supra note 3, at 28.
66. Green, supra note 3, at 28.
67. Cornejo, supra note 61, at 24. Just before the Symposium, two State Farm Insurance Co.
employees, Cori and Kerri Rigsby, publicly alleged that State Farm supervisors pressured outside engi-
neers to alter reports so that it appeared that homeowners' damages were caused by water rather than
wind. The Rigsby sisters claim that such fraud was "widespread" at State Farm offices in Biloxi and
Gulfport, Mississippi. Employees Allege Katrina Fraud, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26, 2006, § 2, at 2. The merit
of these accusations is still uncertain.
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caused by flooding. These determinations are difficult generally and im-
possible where a structure is totally destroyed.68
The potential for insurance disputes accompanying Katrina-related
losses is obvious and the difficulty in resolving many of these disputes is
equally apparent. It is settled insurance law that the insured bears the bur-
den of establishing that a particular loss falls within a policy's coverage.69
The burden then shifts to the insurer to show that the loss falls within a
policy exclusion. 70 With respect to dwellings and other structures, home-
owners' policies afford all-risk coverage, meaning that they insure against
direct physical loss caused by all risks except those that are specifically ex-
cluded. It will be easy for insureds to demonstrate direct physical loss to
their homes, thus shifting to insurers the burden of proving that the loss
was caused by storm surge or the like.7' Water damage exclusions are
"valid and enforceable. '72 But how will insurers carry their burden of
proof in cases where the property is totally destroyed? What of the many
losses where there are no witnesses? Is reliable scientific evidence
available?
Of course, there will be many instances where an insurer will be able
to demonstrate that storm surge or some other form of flooding at the very
least contributed to causing the loss. For example, a building may bear a
water line-thus allowing the insurer to exclude all damage below it on the
basis that such damage was caused by flooding, while paying for all damage
above it on the theory that such damage must be attributable to wind. His-
torically, policyholders facing multiple causes of loss, some of which are
covered and some of which are not, have been able to obtain coverage
under the concurrent causation doctrine. The concurrent causation doc-
trine varies between states. Under the majority approach in first-party in-
surance cases, "if multiple concurrent causes exist and if the dominant,
most significant or most important cause is a covered peril, coverage exists
for the entire loss; otherwise the loss is not covered. '73 This is an efficient
proximate cause analysis. Mississippi takes the efficient proximate cause
approach. 74 Thus, where storm victims can show, for example, that their
homes were destroyed by wind before storm surge swept over their prop-
erty, their losses will be covered. 75 The problem, again, is one of proof-
especially with total losses.
When it comes to damage to personal property, the analysis is flipped.
Personal property coverage in a standard homeowners' policy extends only
68. Cornejo, supra note 61, at 24.
69. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Co Fat Le, 439 F.3d 436, 439 (8th Cir. 2006); Nelson v. Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co., 630 S.E.2d 221, 229 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Hobson Constr. Co. v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 322 S.E.2d 632, 635 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
70. Co Fat Le, 439 F.3d at 439; Nelson, 630 S.E.2d at 229.
71. See Buente v. Allstate Ins. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 690, 696 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
72. Id.
73. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 587 (3d ed. 2002).
74. Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 217, 224 (Miss. 1972).
75. Id. (discussing destruction of building during Hurricane Camille).
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to specified perils.76 Thus, and by way of example, it is the insured's bur-
den to prove that loss to property contained in a home caused by rain is
attributable to the direct force of wind or hail causing an opening in the
roof or a wall that allowed the rain to enter. This can be done in some
cases, but presumably not in all.77
Hurricane Katrina will doubtless spawn all sorts of other coverage is-
sues, including disputes over the application of different or multiple de-
ductibles78 and situations in which ambiguities in policies may allow
insureds to successfully argue for coverage even where hurricane rains are
the efficient proximate cause of their losses.7 9 Perhaps most interesting is
the lawsuit filed against a number of insurance companies by Mississippi
Attorney General Jim Hood."° The allegations in the Hood complaint are
so vague as to make them difficult to evaluate on the merits. Several
points, however, bear mention.
First, Mr. Hood alleges that wind-driven rain exclusions are "void and
unenforceable as violations of the public policy of the State of Mississippi"
because they offend Mississippi concurrent causation law.81 What Mr.
Hood appears to be referring to is the windstorm or hail peril found in the
personal property coverage of standard homeowners' insurance policies.
Again, personal property coverage in standard homeowners' policies is
specified-peril coverage, and while policies insure against direct physical
loss caused by windstorms or hail, these perils do not include loss to prop-
erty in a building caused by rain "unless the direct force of wind or hail
damages the building causing an opening in a roof or wall and the rain...
enters through this opening."82 It is unlikely that an insurer's decision to
structure its windstorm or hail peril in this way violates public policy in
general, 3 but it is especially difficult to see how this language is contrary to
public policy on the ground that it defeats Mississippi's concurrent causa-
tion doctrine.
When it comes to a homeowner's personal property loss, it is clear that
a windstorm and hail are each a covered peril, and it is equally clear that
76. AUTO CLUB FAMILY INS. Co., supra note 38, at 17-20.
77. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Byrne, 248 So. 2d 777, 778-81 (Miss. 1971) (finding
for insured in case arising out of Hurricane Camille).
78. See, e.g., Turner Constr. Co. v. ACE Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2005) (involv-
ing dispute over whether wind deductible or lower general deductible applied to damages caused by
rain where rain entered building through wind-created openings).
79. See, e.g., Buente v. Allstate Ins. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 690, 696-97 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (discussing
hurricane deductible and combined causes exclusion).
80. Complaint and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Hood ex reL State of Miss. v. Miss.
Farm Bureau Ins., Civ. Action No. G2005-1642R1 (Hinds County, Miss. Ch. Ct. 2005) [hereinafter
Hood Complaint] (on file with author).
81. Id. at 7.
82. AUTO CLUB FAMILY INS. Co., supra note 38, at 17-18.
83. Fla. Windstorm Underwriting v. Gajwani, 934 So. 2d 501, 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding that language does not violate Florida public policy).
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rain is not.84 Where wind or hail is the peril "to which legal liability at-
taches"85 or which sets other causes of loss (such as water damage from
rain) in motion,86 then it is the efficient cause of the insured's loss, and the
insured's loss will be covered even if property contained in the home is
destroyed because it is waterlogged. That is essentially what the windstorm
or hail peril in a standard homeowners' insurance policy provides. On the
other hand, assume that rain enters an insured's home not because hail or
wind blows out windows or blows off the roof, but because the roof leaked
as a result of aging or normal wear-and-tear or because the insured left
windows open in her haste to evacuate. In those cases, wind or hail would
not be the efficient proximate cause of the water damage inside the in-
sured's home, and the insurer ought not to have pay for the associated loss.
Again, this is what a standard policy provides. How then does such a policy
provision abrogate Mississippi concurrent causation law? The short answer
is that it does not. How does this policy language violate Mississippi public
policy? Again, it does not.
Another possibility is that Mr. Hood is referring to exclusions in
homeowners' policies that exclude from coverage direct physical loss to a
dwelling or structure caused by flood, surface water, waves, tidal water,
overflow of a body of water, "or spray from any of these, whether or not
driven by wind."87 Coverages for dwellings and other structures in a home-
owners' policy are all-risk, meaning that buildings to which they apply are
insured against all perils other than those specifically excluded. Windstorm
and hail losses are therefore covered, but flooding and other forms of water
damage are specifically excluded (hence the need for flood insurance).
Thus an insured will have coverage where wind or hail was the efficient
proximate cause of the loss, as where wind obliterates a building before
storm surge hits.88 On the other hand, a home that is inundated by storm
surge instead of being blown to smithereens by hurricane winds is not cov-
ered by a standard homeowners' policy. Again, standard policy provisions
appear to be entirely consistent with Mississippi concurrent causation law,
and therefore any related public policy arguments seem dubious at best.
Second, but more fundamentally, if the insurance policy provisions
about which Mr. Hood's lawsuit complains are against public policy, then
Mississippi's insurance regulatory scheme has utterly failed. If these provi-
sions violate public policy, the Mississippi Insurance Department never
should have allowed insurers admitted to do business in the state to include
them in their policies. Because the Department did permit them, however,
84. AuTo CLUB FAMILY INS. Co., supra note 38, at 17-20.
85. Kemp v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1968) (discussing windstorm loss
and efficient proximate cause under Mississippi law).
86. Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1963).
87. AUTO CLUB FAMILY INS. Co., supra note 38, at 20-21.
88. See, e.g., Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So. 2d 217, 224 (Miss. 1972) (finding coverage
because office building was destroyed by wind from Hurricane Camille before storm surge hit); Lititz
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boatner, 254 So. 2d 765, 766-67 (Miss. 1971) (finding coverage where wind from Hurri-
cane Camille obliterated dwelling before tidal wave hit).
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these provisions presumably respect Mississippi public policy. Mississippi
Deputy Commissioner of Insurance Lee Harrell's balanced remarks at a
recent legal symposium on Hurricane Katrina confirm this conclusion.89
Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Hood does not believe the
Department erred or that the Commissioner of Insurance committed some
related malfeasance, since in his press release trumpeting his lawsuit the
Attorney General mentioned nothing about the Department or the Com-
missioner-he attacked only the insurance industry.9°
Third, the Hood lawsuit and others making similar allegations (such as
those filed by Mississippi trial lawyer Dickie Scruggs) potentially carry with
them serious and unintended consequences. Regional insurers could be
forced into insolvency if these suits are successful. 91 If the insurers are so
affected, responsibility for paying claims under their policies will pass to
the Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association. Even if they are not
driven into insolvency, insurers that lose these lawsuits or that pay extor-
tionate settlements may withdraw from the Mississippi insurance market.
As one knowledgeable insurance economist observed, "[t]he certain out-
come of a victory by [Scruggs] or Hood would be the virtual overnight
disappearance of insurance in [Mississippi]." 9 Skeptics may consider that
prediction exaggerated (especially given the result in Leonard v. Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Co.,9' discussed later,94 and Mississippi federal dis-
trict courts' present reluctance to certify some homeowners' cases as class
actions or to consolidate them95), but the fact remains that the withdrawal
of but one or two major insurers from the Mississippi market would have
significant adverse consequences for consumers. If Mr. Hood is duty-
bound "to protect the interests of the general public" as he alleges in his
lawsuit, how exactly does he satisfy that duty by materially impairing the
Mississippi insurance market in the best case and obliterating it in the
worst?
96
Messrs. Hood and Scruggs argue that these concerns are invalid be-
cause (1) the insurance industry made a profit exceeding $40 billion in
2005, so it has plenty of money to pay Mississippians' claims; 97 (2) insurers
89. Mississippi Deputy Comm'r of Insurance Lee Harrell, Remarks at Hurricane Katrina: A Le-
gal Symposium, Mississippi College School of Law (Aug. 29, 2006) (on file with the Mississippi College
Law Review).
90. Press Release, State of Miss., Attorney General Jim Hood Files Complaint and Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order Against Insurance Industry to Protect Mississippi's Victims of Hurricane
Katrina (Sept. 15, 2005) (on file with author).
91. Patricia Vowinkel, Katrina's Lawsuit Surge: A Legal Battle to Force Insurers to Pay for Flood
Damage from Hurricane Katrina Could Cost the Industry Billions, http://www.findarticles.com/plarti-
cles/mimOBJK/is 15_16/ai-n15930125 (last visited June 21, 2006) (quoting Robert P. Hartwig).
92. Id.
93. 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
94. See infra notes 112-42 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
96. Hood Complaint, supra note 80, at 1-2.
97. Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood, Remarks at Hurricane Katrina: A Legal Sympo-




will not withdraw from the Mississippi market because there is too much
money to be made in the state;98 and (3) insurers who withdraw will violate
antitrust laws.99 None of these arguments are persuasive.
First, the fact that the United States insurance industry as a whole
made a $40 billion profit in 2005 is meaningless, since that figure encom-
passes all companies, all types of coverage, and all jurisdictions. States in-
dividually regulate the insurance industry. By law, insurance rates in each
state must reflect the loss experience in that state alone. 100 As a result,
each line of insurance must stand alone in any profitability analysis.' In-
surers cannot use profits generated by their professional liability or auto
insurance units, for example, to subsidize homeowners' insurance losses at-
tributable to catastrophes. Insurers cannot use homeowners' insurance
profits generated in Iowa or Wisconsin to subsidize hurricane-related
homeowners' losses in Louisiana or Mississippi."' Industry-wide profit-
ability is therefore irrelevant to Mississippians' insurance coverage for
losses from Hurricane Katrina. Besides, the mere fact that an industry is
profitable is no basis for reforming contracts lawfully entered into by its
members. The idea of arbitrarily redistributing private wealth to accom-
plish patently political goals is repugnant.
Second, the argument that the Mississippi property insurance market
represents too much money for insurers to forego is belied by the preced-
ing discussion of insurer profitability, but it is flawed in other ways as well.
For one thing, insurers do not have to withdraw from the state for consum-
ers to suffer long-term economic disadvantage from plaintiffs' attempts to
broadly reform their policies. All insurers have to do is reduce their policy
limits or require higher deductibles for consumers to be adversely affected
by these lawsuits. For another thing, insurers could stop writing property
insurance in the state through admitted companies and instead offer it on a
surplus lines basis, 0 3 meaning that the Mississippi Insurance Department
would no longer approve the language of insurers' policies or regulate their
rates. This would allow insurance companies to charge higher rates and
impose policy terms arguably less favorable to policyholders. Moreover,
not all insurers are equal. The fact that there are premiums to be collected
in Mississippi does not mean that if one established carrier withdraws from
the market, it will be replaced by a company of equal financial strength.
98. Richard F. Scruggs, Remarks at Hurricane Katrina: A Legal Symposium, Mississippi College
School of Law (Aug. 29, 2006) (on file with the Mississippi College Law Review).
99. Hood, supra note 97.
100. Hartwig, supra note 20, at 2.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Insurers are fundamentally classified as either admitted or non-admitted. An admitted in-
surer is licensed to do business in the insured's home state, while a non-admitted insurer is not. Admit-
ted insurers' policy forms and the rates they intend to charge for coverage are approved by the
admitting state's insurance department; not so with non-admitted insurers. Non-admitted insurers are
referred to as surplus lines insurers. Most insurance holding companies write business through both
admitted and surplus lines companies. Douglas R. Richmond, Surplus Lines Insurance and Wholesale
Brokers, 25 INS. LITIG. REP. 261, 261 (2003).
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Finally on this point, why even risk long-term harm to a key industry and
the resulting harm to consumers? Instead, why not craft a plan to persuade
more Mississippians to buy flood insurance? Why not enact a statewide
building code that would lead to the construction of more storm-resistant
structures?
10 4
Third, a single insurer's withdrawal from the state would likely raise
no antitrust issues. The same is true if several insurers withdraw for inde-
pendent, economically justifiable reasons. But if just one withdrawing in-
surer is a major player in the Mississippi market-such as Allstate or State
Farm-the consequences for consumers could be considerable.
In the same vein, it is no answer to say that these suits will have no
material effect on insurers doing business in Mississippi because they will
be settled and reinsurers will ultimately bear those costs under the "follow
the fortunes" or "follow the settlements" doctrine.10 5 First, not all affected
insurers may have reinsured their Katrina-related losses, and few (if any)
were entirely reinsured. Second, the "follow the fortunes" doctrine and
related provisions in reinsurance agreements do not override all other con-
ditions, terms, and limits in those agreements.1 °6 If coverage that would
not otherwise exist is created by agents' misrepresentations, the "follow the
fortunes" doctrine may not apply.'07 Third, it seems probable that many
reinsurers would decline to indemnify their cedents for these settlements
on the ground that any associated payments were clearly outside the scope
of coverage and therefore were made ex gratia (i.e., as favors or to enhance
goodwill rather than as legal obligations).,08 London market reinsurers are
almost certain to argue that any settlements are not covered under their
reinsurance treaties. 10 9
In summary, insurance policies are contracts and insurers have to be
able to accurately price their contractual obligations. Their ability to do so
depends on the terms of those contracts being enforced. Some insurers
have perhaps drafted policies that will prove ambiguous. Others may have
added endorsements or charged multiple deductibles that have created am-
biguity where none would have existed otherwise. These insurance compa-
nies will pay a price for such errors, and those carriers which deny claims in
104. See Ripley, supra note 12, at 56 (discussing the benefits of statewide building codes and not-
ing that Mississippi still has no such code).
105. These clauses obligate a reinsurer to indemnify its cedent for good faith payments made in
connection with claims reasonably appearing to be within the coverage afforded by the underlying
insurance policy. JOHN S. DIACONIS & DOUGLAS W. HAMMOND, REINSURANCE LAW § 3:2, at 3-28
(2005).
106. Vitkowsky, supra note 44, at 1019.
107. Id. at 1025.
108. See DIACONIS & HAMMOND, supra note 105, § 1:9.1, at 1-18.
109. See Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. NRG Victory Reinsurance Ltd., [1998] 2 LLOYD'S
REP. 600 (involving settlement following the Exxon Valdez disaster).
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bad faith will face resulting liability. But Attorney General Hood's at-
tempt to void standard policy provisions on a widespread basis and similar
efforts by private lawyers are misguided. 1°
B. Litigation to Date
Most, if not all, of the Katrina-related lawsuits against insurers have
been initiated by insureds who opted not to purchase flood insurance."'
At the time this Article was prepared, only one case involving a homeown-
ers' policy had gone to trial. That case, Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual In-
surance Co., 1 2 turned out well for the insurance industry." 3 The insureds
in Leonard, Paul and Julie Leonard, purchased a homeowners' policy with
Nationwide from Jay Fletcher, a Nationwide agent in Pascagoula, Missis-
sippi."' The policy contained a standard water damage exclusion and a
combined causes exclusion." 5 The Leonards did not purchase flood insur-
ance for their home.'16 Paul Leonard asked Fletcher whether he needed
flood insurance and Fletcher told him that he did not because he did not
live in a flood zone." 7 Fletcher's conduct in this regard was a mystery to
the trial court:
Fletcher did not carry flood insurance on his own prop-
erty, and his office assistant, Cindy Byrd Collins, did not
carry flood insurance on her property.
Fletcher sometimes discouraged his clients from
purchasing flood insurance policies .... There was enough
evidence on this point to warrant the conclusion that
Fletcher, as a matter of habit and routine, expressed his
opinion, when he was asked, that customers should not
110. The rhetoric surrounding the Attorney General's lawsuit serves no valid purpose. Mr. Hood
freely admits saying that insurers "are in lockstep like Nazis locking arms, coming at those people down
there on the coast." Insurance Group, Miss. Attorney General in Spat over "Nazi" Remark, http://www.
badfaithinsurance.org/reference/general/0518a.htm (last visited June 21, 2006). That assertion is de-
monstrably false. When challenged on his Nazi analogy, Mr. Hood responded: "If they [meaning the
insurers he has sued] are so confident in their policies, why don't they quit with the delay tactics and
meet me in court?" Id. That statement defies all reason. Does Mr. Hood really mean to suggest that
insurance companies, merely by virtue of their business, ought not be allowed to pursue a litigation
strategy they believe is most likely to lead to a favorable outcome? That removal to federal court
should simply be denied them? The answer to these questions, based on Mr. Hood's remarks at the
Symposium, is "yes." Mr. Hood's indignation is especially difficult to understand given his early public
statements about wanting his case and others like it in state courts, where he expected that insurers
would be less likely to receive fair trials. Walter Olson, Insurers Can Breathe Easier over Katrina Law-
suits, TIMES ONLINE, Aug. 30, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,200-2334835,00.html. Any
objective observer would expect that insurers aware of those remarks would attempt to avail them-
selves of federal jurisdiction.
111. Yerak, supra note 17, at 4 (quoting Robert Hartwig).
112. 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
113. Id. at 696. The case was dismissed, as "Nationwide ... met the burden of proving.., that all
other damage to the Leonard's property was caused by water and waterborne materials . Id.
114. Id. at 687.
115. Id. at 687-88.
116. Id. at 691.
117. Id. at 690.
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purchase flood insurance unless they lived in a flood prone
area . . . where flood insurance was required in connection
with mortgage loans. But between 2001 and the time of
Hurricane Katrina, Fletcher sold approximately 187 flood
insurance policies in the Pascagoula area. Fletcher sold 12
flood insurance policies in the neighborhood where the Le-
onards live. There was no testimony from which [the court]
can discern the reason Fletcher discouraged some of his cli-
ents from purchasing flood insurance policies, the reason
Fletcher did not have flood insurance on his own property,
or the reason he did sell 187 flood policies in the Pascagoula
area and a dozen flood policies in the Leonard
neighborhood." 8
Leonard inferred from Fletcher's statement that he did not need flood
insurance because his homeowners' policy would cover water damage
caused by a hurricane. 19 "This was an erroneous inference and one that
might have been avoided had either party to the conversation been more
articulate in his inquiry or his response. "120 Regardless, it was undisputed
that Fletcher did not misrepresent the terms of the policy, nor did he say
anything that could be reasonably understood to alter the policy's terms.
121
"In fact, Fletcher and Leonard never had any discussion of specific policy
provisions and coverages. "122
Hurricane Katrina extensively damaged the Leonards' home.1 23 "Al-
most all of the damage ... [was] attributable to [storm surge]. 124 The
Leonards' home was inundated by five feet of water. 125 Wind damage was
relatively minor.126 Following an inspection of the home, a Nationwide ad-
juster issued the Leonards a check for just over $1600 for wind-damaged
items. 127 The Leonards contended that they suffered total storm damages
of over $130,000, of which over $47,000 was attributable to wind.' 28 They
hired Dickie Scruggs's law firm to sue Nationwide on their behalf and the
battle was joined. The case was tried to Senior Judge L.T. Senter of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
129
The court in Leonard determined that almost all of the plaintiffs' dam-
ages were caused by water incursion, not wind.13 0 This was significant,
118. Id. at 690-91.
119. Id. at 691.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 691-92.
122. Id. at 693.
123. Id. at 687.
124. Id. at 695.
125. Id. at 689.
126. See id. at 689, 695.
127. Id. at 690.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 687.
130. Id. at 695.
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because the court also resolved that "[t]he provisions of the Nationwide
policy that exclude coverage for damages caused by water are valid and
enforceable terms of the insurance contract.' 31 The court did find the
combined causes exclusion in the Nationwide policy to be unenforce-
able.' 32 Nationwide had never invoked the combined causes exclusion to
deny coverage, apparently agreeing with the court that the exclusion, read
literally, rendered illusory the windstorm protection that its policy clearly
provided. 33 Ultimately, the court entered judgment for the Leonards for
just over $1200, a figure reflecting window damage and cleaning expenses
that the plaintiffs proved were caused or necessitated by wind, for which
Nationwide had not originally paid.
34
The decision in Leonard drew national attention. 135 Although some
observers contend that neither side won in Leonard-Nationwide spent
huge sums of money in its defense and the Leonards remain uncompen-
sated for the loss of their home-the case was actually a victory for the
insurance industry. The outcome was a triumph for insurance companies
because the justice system worked as it should have: the parties disagreed
over coverage, the case was tried to an unbiased judge, and one party car-
ried its burden of proof while the other did not. The court did not invali-
date clear policy language regarding water damage on amorphous public
policy grounds or manufacture ambiguity where there was none. Instead,
the court fairly decided the case on the narrowest grounds possible. Other
cases may turn out differently, but that is the nature of our system of jus-
tice, where different trials yield different outcomes because they involve
different facts. Of course, the court's enforcement of the water damage
exclusion in the Leonards' policy generally bodes well for insurers.
136
Parties increasingly litigate big cases in the press, and, not surprisingly,
Mr. Scruggs and his clients publicly proclaimed victory in Leonard.137 Mr.
Scruggs had announced before trial that if he lost the Leonard case, he
would have to "spin it the best way" he could. 38 This he did, despite re-
covering just over $1200 of the approximately $130,000 the Leonards
claimed to be owed and seeing the court uphold the water damage exclu-
sion that appears in every policy that will be litigated in future cases.'39
The plaintiffs' hollow claim of victory is premised on the fact that the court
struck down the combined causes exclusion in the Nationwide policy.'4 °
That ruling is insignificant, however, since it afforded the Leonards no
meaningful relief and few insurers are likely relying on it to deny coverage.
131. Id. at 693.
132. Id. at 694.
133. Id. at 695.
134. See id. at 696.
135. See, e.g., Becky Yerak, Plaintiffs Lose on Katrina, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 16, 2006, § 3, at 1 (charac-
terizing the decision as positive for the insurance industry).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Olson, supra note 110 (quoting Richard Scruggs).
139. Id. (quoting Richard Scruggs and Paul Leonard).
140. Scruggs, supra note 98.
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In the Leonard case, Nationwide conceded that the combined causes exclu-
sion did not operate to exclude coverage for wind damage.141
Additionally, Mr. Scruggs has acknowledged the Leonards' weak case,
but he insists that they pressed to trial because if the court had voided the
water damage exclusion in the Nationwide policy it would have been
"game over," since all standard policies include this exclusion. 142 That ra-
tionalization is suspect. Had the court thrown out the exclusion, Nation-
wide certainly would have appealed and would have continued to
vigorously defend every case against it until it received an unfavorable ap-
pellate ruling. Only then would Nationwide have considered settlement on
a widespread basis. The same is true for all other insurers. In other words,
if the court had thrown out the water damage exclusion in the Nationwide
policy, then the situation would have remained "game on" rather than be-
coming "game over."
More recently, Mississippi federal courts have declined to certify class
actions aimed at collectively litigating homeowners' insurance claims,143
and they have similarly declined to consolidate homeowners' suits against
their insurers. 144 These rulings are clearly correct, inasmuch as each in-
sured's purchase of coverage was a separate transaction involving distinct
and different communications. Hurricane Katrina caused different types of
damage in different places in different times, causing common questions of
fact and law to be dwarfed by questions affecting individual litigants.
These claims or cases are simply not suitable for class action treatment or
anything like it.
145
C. Insurance Agent and Broker Liability
In addition to insurance companies themselves, insurance agents and
brokers are likely litigation targets when insureds discover that they do not
have the coverage that they thought or wished they had purchased. Na-
tionwide agent Jay Fletcher's conduct was obviously scrutinized in the Leo-
nard case.146 While several lawsuits have been filed against intermediaries
thus far, 147 these actions are relatively few in number.' 48 The volume of
cases of this nature is likely to increase if policyholders' lawyers see that
141. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 694 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
142. Scruggs, supra note 98.
143. See, e.g., Guice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2006 WL 2359474, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 14,
2006).
144. Becky Yerak, Katrina Ruling Favors Allstate, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 2006, § 3, at 3; Michael
Kunzelman, Judge Rules Katrina Lawsuits Against Insurers Must Be Filed Separately, Sept. 8, 2006,
http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060908/NEWS/60908023&G.
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (governing class actions).
146. Leonard, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 690-92.
147. See, e.g., Leboeuf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2006 WL 1615980 (S.D. Miss. June 6, 2006);
Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2006 WL 1442489 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2006); Buente v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
148. Few Big Players in the Agent/Broker E&O Market, BEST'S REV., June 2006, at 24, 24.
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claims against carriers on other theories are unlikely to succeed. 49 Buente
v. Allstate Insurance Co.150 is a representative case.
Plaintiffs John and Sheila Buente bought a home in Gulfport, Missis-
sippi.15' They insured the dwelling with Allstate by purchasing a home-
owners' policy from agent Brenda Pace,1 52 who allegedly told them that
"they would have full and comprehensive coverage for any and all hurri-
cane damage, including any and all damage proximately, efficiently and
typically caused by hurricane wind and 'storm surge' proximately caused by
hurricanes. '15  The Buentes further contended that they asked Pace
whether they should purchase flood insurance, and that her employee told
them that they did not need the protection because their home was not in a
flood plain and their policy afforded hurricane coverage. 154 The plaintiffs
allegedly relied on these representations and "their own subjective expec-
tations" when deciding not to buy flood insurance. 155 The Buentes' prop-
erty was damaged by "'hurricane wind, rain, and/or storm surge from
Hurricane Katrina."1 56 Allstate gave the Buentes a check for just over
$2600, apparently reflecting the Allstate adjuster's determination of dam-
age attributable to wind rather than water.157 The plaintiffs claimed to
have suffered covered losses of between $50,000 and $100,000. The
Buentes sued both Allstate and Pace, and Allstate moved to dismiss the
complaint.
The Buentes alleged that Allstate was bound by Pace's coverage rep-
resentations and that she negligently misrepresented the scope of Allstate's
coverage. The court noted that an agent can sometimes bind an insurer,
and in certain circumstances both the insurer and agent may be liable for
the agent's misrepresentations concerning coverage.' 58 Although Pace
"was under no duty to advise the plaintiffs what coverages were necessary
for the protection of their property," she and her employees were obligated
to answer accurately if the plaintiffs specifically asked them about the need
for flood insurance.' 59 Furthermore, at the motion to dismiss stage, the
court was obligated to accept as true the Buentes' allegation that they rea-
sonably relied on the assurances they received from Pace and her employ-
ees. 160 For these reasons and others related to Allstate's policy language,
the court denied Allstate's motion to dismiss.
1 61
149. Rick Cornejo, Katrina's Next Wave, BEST'S REV., June 2006, at 22, 22.
150. 422 F. Supp. 2d 690.




155. Id. at 693.
156. Id. (quoting plaintiffs' complaint).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 697 (citing Nichols v. Shelter Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1991)).
159. Id. at 697-98.
160. Id. at 698.
161. Id.
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Turning now to some insurance law basics, the term "agent" is com-
monly understood to describe an intermediary who is employed by an in-
surance company "to represent it in dealings with third parties on
insurance matters. 16 2 The term "[a]gent also may refer to an intermediary
who sells only one insurance company's products and who, though an inde-
pendent contractor compensated on commission paid by the insurer, is
identified and treated as" the insurer's agent.163 A "broker," on the other
hand, is not linked to a particular insurer. Brokers have relationships with
several insurers and are compensated by way of commissions paid by the
insurers with which they place coverage. "Brokers are sometimes ... [de-
scribed] . . . as independent agents and are generally considered to be the
insured's agent.,
164
The relationship between insurance companies and their agents is con-
trolled by agency law principles, and agents can bind the insurance compa-
nies for which they work under several traditional agency theories.165 The
same is not true for brokers. If a broker is functioning as an insured's
agent, his knowledge or conduct cannot be imputed to the insurer with
which he places coverage.
1 66
Both agents and brokers have no duty to advise insureds about the
adequacy of insurance coverage they purchase, about the scope of that cov-
erage, about the suitability of a policy, or about optional coverages that
might be available.167 Their duty is to attempt to procure the coverage the
insured specifically requests and to tell the insured if they are unable to
obtain the coverage. 168 The fact that agents and brokers often do advise
insureds about desirable coverages, the availability of differing coverage
limits, the wisdom of purchasing optional coverages, and so forth means
only that they think their business interests will be served thereby and that
they are willing to assume any legal duties which may arise. This does not
mean that they otherwise have a duty to render such advice. Of course,
where an insured asks an agent or broker about the coverage provided by
the policy he is purchasing, the intermediary must answer the questions
honestly.
169
There are several issues that courts will have to confront in suits
against insurance agents and brokers.170 First, when insureds allege that
162. Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC.
L.J. 1, 3 (2004).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 5.
165. JERRY, supra note 73, at 255-56.
166. Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Issues in the Sale of Life Insurance, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 877, 889 (2005).
167. See, e.g., Owens v. Miss. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 910 So. 2d 1065, 1074 (Miss. 2005). The
court rejected the argument that the agent had a duty to explain to insured his right to purchase unin-
sured motorist coverage "over and above amount of coverage required by statute." Id. at 1076.
168. Richmond, supra note 162, at 16-22.
169. See Buente v. Allstate Ins. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 690, 697-98 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
170. Because insurance agents work for a disclosed principal (the insurance company they re-
present), they cannot be individually liable for breach of contract if the insurer wrongfully denies cover-
age. Likewise, they cannot be liable for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in
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they relied to their detriment on their agents' or brokers' representations
that their standard homeowners' policies insured them against hurricane-
related flooding or storm surge, they will be hard pressed to prevail on such
claims in light of the crystal clear language in standard policies excluding
coverage for water damage.' 7 ' Mississippi law imputes knowledge of policy
contents to insureds even if they do not read their policies.' 72 Insureds may
attempt to escape this rule by arguing that they did not have copies of their
policies at the time of the alleged misrepresentations and therefore could
not discover them.173 Once insureds accept policies for a reasonable time
without complaining about the coverage afforded, however, they are bound
by the terms of the policies regardless.174 Thus, insureds making misrepre-
sentation claims are likely to prevail only where they had copies of their
policies for a very short time before Hurricane Katrina struck or where
they complained about the water damage exclusion or hail and windstorm
peril coverage when they received their policies.
175
Second, insureds' requests for "full coverage," the "best policy availa-
ble," "adequate protection," and the like do not trigger a duty for in-
termediaries to advise insureds about coverage needs or optional
coverages. 176 Thus, for example, insureds who did not have flood insurance
cannot reasonably allege that their statements along these lines should
have obliged their agents or brokers to advise them about its availability
and importance.
Third, if insureds allege that their agents or brokers negligently mis-
represented the terms of policies, the misrepresentations must have been
material.1 77 If the insureds would have purchased the same policies had
the truth been told, the misrepresentations cannot have been material.
1 78
Since most homeowners' policies are standardized, most negligent misrep-
resentation claims probably will be linked to flood insurance. In those
cases, insureds will have to prove that they would have obtained flood in-
surance but for the misrepresentations of their agents or brokers. Of
course, even commercial insureds that purchased flood coverage may claim
misrepresentation because flood insurance policies do not provide business
interruption coverage (which they will surely claim was important to
all insurance policies, nor are they liable for ordinary negligence in performing their duties. They can
be independently liable if their conduct amounts to a separate tort, such as fraud. Jabour v. Life Ins.
Co. of N. Am., 362 F. Supp. 2d 736, 740-41 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (interpreting Mississippi law).
171. See Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 850 So. 2d 78, 82 (Miss. 2003)
(reciting the general rule that a person will not "'be heard to complain of an oral misrepresentation the
error of which would have been disclosed by reading the contract"') (quoting Godfrey, Bassett & Kuy-
kendall Architects, Ltd. v. Huntington Lumber & Supply Co., 584 So. 2d 1254, 1257 (Miss. 1991)).
172. Cherry v. Anthony, 501 So. 2d 416, 419 (Miss. 1987).
173. See Reed v. Am. Med. Sec. Group, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 798, 802 (S.D. Miss. 2004).
174. See Atlas Roofing Mfg. Co. v. Robinson & Julienne, Inc., 279 So. 2d 625, 629 (Miss. 1973); see
also Reed, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 802 (citing Atlas Roofing for this proposition).
175. See Reed, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 802-03 (illustrating the importance of insureds' complaining
about policy terms in misrepresentation cases).
176. Richmond, supra note 162, at 30.
177. Id. at 13.
178. Id.
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them). 179 Likewise, individual insureds who purchased flood insurance
may be surprised to learn that it does not cover living expenses, and they
may accuse their agents or brokers of misrepresentation as a result.1
80
Fourth, many cases against agents and brokers probably will be ill-
suited for resolution by summary judgment. The parties will have different
recollections of what was said and there will be other genuine disputes over
material facts.181 These cases will therefore strain judicial resources if, in
fact, a significant number of them are filed.
Fifth, plaintiffs must be prepared to offer expert testimony as to the
standard of care for insurance intermediaries when it comes to recom-
mending flood insurance.' 8 2 Brokers and agents clearly have no duty to
suggest that customers purchase flood insurance, but how should they re-
spond when customers ask whether they should? When asked, an agent
might say, "the company will probably take the position that its policy does
not cover flood damage, so you may want flood insurance" or "it depends
on how risk averse you are" or simply "yes." An agent or broker probably
will not say "I am unwilling to answer that question because I do not want
to assume a duty to advise you on coverage where one would not otherwise
exist," nor will he say "read your homeowners' policy and decide whether
you need flood insurance."
But what if an agent or broker tells an inquiring insured that he does
not need to purchase flood insurance because his home is not located in a
flood plain? Does that answer meet the standard of care applicable to in-
surance intermediaries? The court in Leonard specifically noted the lack of
evidence "to establish the standard of care applicable to an insurance agent
who is asked about the advisability of purchasing flood insurance."'8 3 The
lack of such evidence did not help the Leonards' case. 184 At the very least,
the court's comment should alert other litigants to the potential need for
expert testimony on agents' and brokers' duties in this regard.
Insurance agents and brokers will, in the future, want to think care-
fully about the advice they give insureds who inquire about the need for
flood insurance. They will also seek to settle on appropriate methods of
documenting such communications.
Finally, it is reasonable to believe that some insureds will not testify
truthfully about their dealings with agents and brokers. A disturbing num-
ber of Americans believe that it is acceptable to lie to obtain increased
insurance benefits. 18 5 With respect to Hurricane Katrina, many insureds
179. See Cornejo, supra note 149, at 24.
180. See id. at 23.
181. Id. (quoting policyholders' attorney on fact-specific nature of these disputes).
182. See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Testimony in Insurance Agent and Broker Litiga-
tion, 28 INs. Lrno. REP. 317 (2006) (discussing the need for expert testimony in cases against insurance
agents and brokers).
183. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 692 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
184. See id.
185. William P. Barrett, Fighting Insurance Fraud, http://www.forbes.com/2003/09/22/cz wb_0922
fraud.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007) (reporting that 25% of all people surveyed "thought that pumping
up the value of a claim submitted to an insurer was OK").
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are so crippled by their losses that it seems reasonable to predict that sheer
desperation will drive them to lie.' 86 Yet more insureds will convince
themselves that they did ask about flood coverage or did complain about
policy exclusions, not because they are naturally dishonest, but because
their lives have been shattered and they simply cannot believe that (given
their usual good judgment) they would not have protected themselves and
their families against the calamity that befell them. None of this should be
read to mean that all insureds will testify falsely to obtain policy benefits
(the Leonards apparently testified truthfully) or even that most insureds
will do so. What it does suggest is that insurance fraud is a concern after
Hurricane Katrina, just as it is after most catastrophes.
D. Business Interruption Coverage
Property insurance compensates an insured for the value of property
that is damaged or destroyed, or for the cost of repairing or replacing such
items.1 87 In the case of a business, damage to its property may force it to
suspend operations and lose income. Because property insurance does not
protect a commercial insured against this risk, businesses may purchase
"business income" or "business interruption" coverage. 188 Business inter-
ruption coverage may be included in commercial "package" policies pro-
viding both third-party and first-party coverages. In any event, business
interruption coverage is intended to indemnify the insured against lost in-
come caused by the suspension of its normal business operations due to a
covered cause of loss. 189 A typical policy affording business interruption
coverage might provide:
We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you
sustain due to the necessary suspension of your "opera-
tions" during the "period of restoration". The suspension
must be caused by direct physical loss of or damage to prop-
erty at the described premises . . . caused by or resulting
from any Covered Cause of Loss.
We will only pay for loss of Business Income that oc-
curs within 12 consecutive months after the date of direct
physical loss or damage .... 190
186. Coalition Against Insurance Fraud, Katrina's Winds Breeding Record Fraud?, http://www.
insurancefraud.org/katrina-fraud.htm (last visited June 22, 2006).
187. William T. Barker, Business Income Insurance in a Disrupted Economy: New Orleans After
Hurricane Katrina, 28 INS. LITIG. REP. 49, 49 (2006).
188. Id.
189. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 439 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
N.Y. JUR. INSURANCE § 539 (2005)).
190. HANOVER INS., supra note 43, at 4.
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"Business income" means the insured's net income (pretax net profit
or loss) that would have been earned or incurred and continuing normal
operating expenses, including payroll.1 91
In addition to lost business income tied to a direct loss, policies may
provide "contingent" business interruption coverage, which extends cover-
age to include losses suffered by the insured that result from damage to
property of suppliers of goods or services to the insured.1 92 The description
of this extension of business interruption coverage as "contingent" is
"something of a misnomer," since it means only that "the insured's busi-
ness interruption loss resulted from damage to a third party's property. "193
In any event, companies that have been spared direct physical losses attrib-
utable to Hurricane Katrina may submit contingent business interruption
claims. Contingent business interruption losses may span the country-
they certainly will not be confined to insureds along the Gulf-and they
will affect all corners of industry. 194
Business interruption coverage may insure against lost income and ex-
tra expense attributable to the actions of civil authorities that prevent the
insured's access to its property, subject to some time limitation. For
example:
"Civil Authority. We will pay for the actual loss of Business
Income you sustain and necessary Extra Expense caused by
action of civil authority that prohibits access to the de-
scribed premises due to direct physical loss of or damage to
property, other than at the described premises, caused by or
resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss. This coverage
will apply for a period of up to two consecutive weeks from
the date of that action.
1 95
Business interruption claims are likely to be asserted by businesses
along the Gulf Coast. Katrina hit the hospitality and tourism industries
hard, battered the chemical industry, and devastated the energy industry.
Hospitals and universities were closed. Loyola University in New Orleans
has sued its business interruption insurer for its allegedly arbitrary and ca-
pricious failure to pay the school's $22.5 million business interruption
claim.t 96 Katrina-related claims will also come from states far from the
191. Id.
192. See Pentair, Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 613, 614 (8th Cir. 2005) (quot-
ing policy); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 2001)
(discussing business disruptions caused by flooding).
193. Pentair, Inc., 400 F.3d at 615 n.3.
194. Arnold F. Mascali, Jr., Contingent Business Interruption Coverage, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 843, 844 (2006).
195. S. Hospitality, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Zurich policy).
196. University Sues over Katrina Payments, CHI. TRIa., Aug. 8, 2006, § 3, at 2. Loyola addition-




Gulf of Mexico because business in those states will experience business
interruptions attributable to damage suffered by their distributors and sup-
pliers along the Gulf Coast. Of course, in order to be covered, an insured's
business interruption must be caused by direct physical loss or damage to




Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophe of incomprehensible proportion.
Large areas of the Gulf Coast remain decimated today. Many insurance
issues remain to be resolved, chief among them the scope of coverage pro-
vided by homeowners' and commercial property insurance policies. Most
policies are clear and unambiguous; they simply do not provide coverage
for losses attributable to the devastating flooding and storm surge that ru-
ined the lives of so many people. Unfortunately, lessening the immediate
loss by invalidating key policy provisions is no answer. Indeed, the post-
Katrina restructuring of the insurer-insured bargain has the potential to
seriously impair insurance markets in affected states. These and other is-
sues doubtless will play out over time. What will we learn? And, based on
what we learn, what will the insurance industry and insurance consumers
do in response before catastrophe strikes again? We can hope that more
consumers purchase flood insurance. We can hope that agents and brokers
document well their customers' specific coverage requests and instructions.
But the truth of the matter is that the insurance industry traditionally han-
dles catastrophes better than other industries and, in light of Katrina,
clearly better than the states and the federal government. Popular anger
with the insurance industry is, for the most part, misdirected.
197. Platt, supra note 45, at 201.
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